Inefficient Short-Time Work by Cahuc, Pierre & Nevoux, Sandra
 Discussion Paper  
  
  
 
INEFFICIENT SHORT-TIME 
WORK 
Pierre Cahuc and Sandra Nevoux 
SCIENCES PO ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER 
No. 2019-03 
 
 
Ine¢ cient Short-Time Work
Pierre Cahuc1 Sandra Nevoux2
March 13, 2019
1Sciences Po, CEPR, IZA. Email: pierre.cahuc@sciencespo.fr.
2Crest-Ensae, École Polytechnique. Email: sandra.nevoux@ensae.fr.
Abstract
This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great
2008-2009 recession were largely to the benet of large rms which are recurrent short-time
work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an ine¢ cient way to provide in-
surance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An e¢ cient
policy should provide unemployment insurance benets funded by experience rated employ-
erscontributions instead of short-time work benets. We nd that short-time work entails
signicant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience
rating.
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1 Introduction
Also called short-time compensation, short-time work is a public program targeted at rms
facing temporary negative shocks. The design aims at reducing job destruction by subsidizing
rms to lower hours of work and provide earnings support to workers facing reduced hours.
Short-time work can avoid ine¢ cient job destruction induced by rms facing limited access to
credit due to capital market imperfection.
In France, before the great 2008-2009 recession, the short-time work scheme was very limited,
with a tiny budget uctuating between 5 and 10 million euros per year. However, in 2009, the
budget expanded signicantly, to about 300 million euros. This expansion was induced by a
strong increase in the demand from rms in distress but also by the government, which decided
to facilitate access to short-time work and to raise short-time work subsidies in order to sustain
employment. In November 2009, a government report,1 co-directed by three representatives
of large rms and one civil servant, recommended pursuing the expansion of short-time work
beyond the end of the recession. In January 2012, once the recession was over, employers
organizations and trade unions signed a national agreement to enlarge the program further
and to raise the subsidies. This national agreement was implemented by a number of decrees
enacted to raise the budget devoted to short-time work. As a consequence, from 2013 on, the
expenditure on short-time work was multiplied by about 20 compared with its pre-recession
level.
Relying on rich data providing detailed information about all short-time work subsidies from
2002 to 2014, we show that this hike in public expenditure primarily beneted large rms which
recurrently use short-time work to deal with seasonal activity uctuations. Then, we present
a model which shows that this expansion of short-time work induces cross-subsidies towards
recurrent short-time work users, which reduce aggregate production. Our model shows that an
e¢ cient policy should instead provide unemployment insurance benets funded by experience
rated employerscontributions. In the unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating,
employers can lay the workers o¤ during the unproductive periods but have to pay for the
induced cost to unemployment insurance. This system induces employers to internalize the
costs of their layo¤s. It incentivizes employers to keep their employees during unproductive
periods to avoid increasing unemployment insurance contributions. Conversely, short-time work
1Brunet et al. (2009).
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is not incentive compatible if it is experience rated, since the introduction of experience rating
in short-time work reduces its attractiveness for employers and hence diminishes short-time
work take-up. Obviously, short-time work is a means to keep employees in their jobs if it
induces small costs to the employers. However, this is an ine¢ cient way to provide insurance,
as it entails cross-subsidies towards short-time work users which reduce aggregate production.
Nevertheless, this is the path taken by French reforms after the recession, under the pressure
of industries which could prospectively benet from the short-time work subsidies. Relying
on our model, we arrive at the assessment that the production loss associated with short-time
work, compared to a system of unemployment insurance with experience rating, is signicant:
it amounts to about 50% of the total amount of short-time work subsidies targeted at recurrent
short-time work users.
These results are a call for a careful design of short-time work and unemployment insurance.
In all countries where short-time work exists, the short-time work hourly benets paid to the
employees for each unworked hour represent a fraction of the hourly wage. In some countries,
the employers pay a portion of the benets and the other part is nanced by public subsidies.2
In other countries, the benets are entirely nanced by public subsidies3 but experience rated
social contributions entail that employers have to pay back a fraction of the short-time work
cost through higher social contributions in the future.4 In yet other countries, employers bear no
short-time work cost at all.5 Our results stress that systems where employers contribute little
to short-time work induce rms facing strong seasonal revenue uctuations to make recurrent
use of short-time work, which reduces aggregate production. Given that, it is important to limit
the recurrent use of short-time work. An e¢ cient way to achieve this objective may be to rely
on an experience rated system, where employers have to pay back a fraction of the short-time
work cost through higher social contributions in the future. This system allows rms facing
short-term nancial constraints to sustain employment without inducing cross-subsidies which
reduce aggregate production. Since the introduction of experience rating in short-time work
reduces its attractiveness for employers, it induces a reduction in the short-time work take-up
2This is the case in Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Switzerland (Hijzen and Venn (2011)). The
employers participation in short-time work might be subject to specic conditions (di¤erentiated schedule of
payment, short-time work duration, establishments or rms size, training, collective agreements).
3These public subsidies can be paid by the unemployment insurance system and/or by the state.
4This is the case in Italy and in the United-States.
5Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Turkey (Hijzen and Venn (2011)).
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rate. Accordingly, this system should be complemented by mandatory unemployment insurance
with experience rated employerscontributions to insure workers.
This paper is related to di¤erent strands of the literature. Several theoretical papers have
shown that short-time work is favorable to employment at the cost of distorting downwards
the number of hours worked per employee6 and the allocative e¢ ciency of the labor market,7
that it improves welfare by mitigating distortions caused by public unemployment insurance8
and that it is welfare-improving when rms cannot fully insure workers against income shocks.9
We complement this literature by focusing on short-time work used by rms facing seasonal
uctuations in their revenue, instead of temporary shocks, which is the case usually considered.
Surprisingly, this issue has been neglected so far, although it is important inasmuch as the
recurrent use of short-time work is a common feature of many short-time work systems.10 We
show that short-time work is ine¢ cient if it induces net transfers towards rms which make
recurrent use of short-time work. In that case, short-time work reduces aggregate production
because it shifts the labor force towards sectors which are less productive, as their manpower
is idle for part of the year. Introducing experience rating is a way to solve this problem. This
result is in line with the literature which has shown that short-time work should be experience
rated to avoid ine¢ cient hours of work per worker11 and that unemployment benets must be
experience rated to avoid excessive layo¤s.12 This result is also in line with the literature which
shows that badly designed public policies can be important sources of misallocation of resources
across rms and sectors, reducing aggregate productivity.13
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information about the short-time work
scheme and the reforms implemented during and after the recession. Section 3 describes the
increase in short-time work expenditure and its beneciaries. Section 4 presents a simple model
which shows that short-time work use is ine¢ cient and induces production losses compared to an
unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating. Section 5 uses the model to quantify
the production losses associated with the recurrent use of short-time work. Section 6 concludes.
6Burdett and Wright (1989), Van Audenrode (1994).
7Cooper, Meyer and Schott (2017).
8Braun and Brügemann (2014).
9Tilly and Niedermayer (2016).
10Boeri and Bruecker (2011).
11Burdett and Wright (1989).
12Feldstein (1976), Blanchard and Tirole (2007), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008).
13This literature is surveyed by Restuccia and Rogerson (2017).
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2 Short-time work policy
Short-time work regulations have changed multiple times since the inception of the policy, in
1951. In this section, we start by describing the general features of short-time work before
presenting the reforms implemented during and after the great 2008-2009 recession.
2.1 General features of short-time work
All private business establishments located in France are eligible for short-time work.
There are six potential valid motives when applying for short-time work: (i) economic
situation; (ii) modernization, restructuring and transformation; (iii) problems in the provision
of raw materials and energy; (iv) accident; (v) exceptionally adverse weather conditions; (vi)
other exceptional circumstances. We will restrict our analysis to the rst motive, which was
the main subject of the reforms under scrutiny in this paper.
Short-time work applies to hours unworked below the weekly legal duration (35 hours, or
below the weekly collectively-agreed or contractual duration when it is below 35 hours). The
yearly number of subsidized hours per employee and per year cannot exceed a certain threshold.
For any employee, periods of short-time work cannot exceed a maximum number of consecutive
weeks (in the case of complete suspension of activity). At that point, she becomes unemployed.
Under short-time work, the employee receives short-time work benets from the establish-
ment for each non-worked hour amounting to a fraction of her hourly wage. The establishment
is then reimbursed by the state. Additionally, if the monthly sum of the net wage and the net
short-time work benets is inferior to the monthly net minimum wage (computed according to
the number of hours of work stipulated in the labor contract), both the establishment and the
state have to nance the di¤erence equally in order for the employee to be paid at least the net
monthly minimum wage.
The procedure granting an establishment the use of short-time work has three steps: appli-
cation, examination and consumption. First, the establishment and its works council discuss
the possibility of using short-time work. At the end of this consultation, the works council
issues a written recommendation. Then, the establishment sends the short-time work appli-
cation form (including the reason, period, number of covered employees, number of hours and
corresponding level of subsidies) together with a document proving its economic di¢ culties to
the local (département-level) agency in charge of labor relations (DIRECCTE). Second, the
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local public authority decides either to reject or approve the application.
Third, when the subsidy is granted, the establishment may use short-time work within the
limits set by the local authority. In case it is used, the establishment sends to the local authority
a reimbursement form (including the number of employees and hours that e¤ectively used short-
time work during the month, and the corresponding level of short-time work subsidies). Upon
receipt, the local authority checks the validity of the request and pays the establishment the
corresponding subsidies.
2.2 The reforms
The large expansion in short-time work at the start of the recession resulted from a deliberate
e¤ort by public decision-makers, who enacted laws, expanded the budget, released circulars and
directives to boost short-time work usage.
In December 2008, the maximum number of short-time work hours per employee per year
increased from 600 to 800 (1000 hours in the industries most severely hit by the recession; in
particular the textile and automobile industries) and the maximum short-time work duration
in case of total suspension of activity was expanded from 4 to 6 weeks. In January 2009,
the short-time work benets received by employees for each subsidized hour increased from
50 to 60% of their previous gross hourly wage; as well, the lower limit associated with these
benets rose from 4.42 to 6.84e. Simultaneously, the subsidy received by the establishment was
expanded: it increased from 2.44 to 3.84e in the case of rms with 250 employees or less, and
from 2.13 to 3.33e for rms with 251 employees or more. In May 2009, a special scheme called
long-term short-time workwas created, whose duration was set between 3 and 12 months.
Under long-term short-time work, the benet perceived by the employee for each short-time
work hour was set to 75% of her previous gross hourly wage and the establishment received an
additional subsidy.14 Moreover, during this period, several ministerial circulars and directives
were sent to the local authorities, calling for easier access to the policy. In particular, the local
authorities were asked to interpret the eligibility conditions in a exible way, resulting in an
increased acceptance of applications.
After the end of the recession, in response to the requests formulated by employersorgani-
14This subsidy was set to 1.90e per hour up to the 50th long-term short-time work hour of a given employee
and to 3.90e beyond the 50th hour.
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zations and trade unions in a national collective agreement,15 new reforms were implemented
in 2012 and 2013, again expanding access to short-time work. These reforms extended the
maximum duration of short-time work, increased the benet and the subsidy per hour16 and
shortened the maximum response time of the local agency in charge of labor relations.
3 The budget expansion and its beneciaries
In this section, we start by describing the data used to characterize the recurrent use of
short-time work. We show that the reforms implemented after the great 2008-2009 recession
dramatically expanded the expenditure on short-time work. Then, we describe the beneciaries
of this budget expansion.
3.1 Data
Information about short-time work comes from Sinapse-Chômage Partiel(from 2002 to 2014)
and Extranet-Activité Partielle (since 2014), two administrative sources produced by the
Statistical Department of the French Labor Ministry (DARES) in collaboration with the Em-
ployment and Vocational Training Agency (DGEFP) which cover all French establishments
using short-time work. We use information about the applying establishment (identication
number, name, city, labor pool, département, region, industry, weekly legal and collective work
duration, number of employees), the nature of the reduction in hours (reason, area, repeated
use, hourly public subsidy, maximum number of short-time work hours per employee and per
year, works council recommendation, labor inspection recommendation, application date) and
short-time work consumption (monthly number of employees e¤ectively under short-time work,
monthly number of short-time work hours consumed and the associated subsidies).
We also use the Déclaration Annuelle de Données Sociales at the establishment level
(DADS-Établissements). The DADS is an administrative dataset produced by the French
National Institute for Statistical and Economic Studies (Insee) which provides information
about wages, labor costs, employment and hours of work aggregated at the establishment level
15Accord National Interprofessionnel, 13th of January 2012.
16In March 2012, the standard subsidy was raised by 1e and the additional subsidy was set to 2.90e. In July
2013, short-time work and long-term short-time work were merged in a single scheme: the benet was set to
70% of the previous gross hourly wage; the subsidy was set to 7.74e for establishments belonging to rms with
250 employees or less and 7.23e for establishments belonging to rms with 251 employees or more.
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for all French establishments.
3.2 The cost of the reforms
Figure 1 shows that the post-recession reforms induced a strong hike in the hourly subsidy
provided to employers, which doubled from 2011 to 2014.17 It is clear that the total short-time
work expenditure increased much faster than the number of short-time work hours. In 2014, the
total number of short-time work hours was the same as in 2012, but the expenditure increased
by 60% between these two dates. Hence, over the 2002-2014 period, the total amount spent
on short-time work, initially correlated with its use, has been progressively disconnected from
the total number of short-time work hours due to the successive reforms of the scheme in 2009,
2012 and 2013, to mostly reect the increase in the hourly short-time work subsidy.
The increase in the hourly short-time work subsidy has led to a dramatic drop in the cost
supported by employers, as shown by Figure 2. For employees paid at the minimum wage, who
had 100% net replacement rate,18 employers had to cover around 50% of the short-time work
cost before January 2009. In July 2013, the employerscontribution dropped to zero, due to
the increase in the subsidy. Figure 2 shows that the cost decreased by the same amount for
wages above the minimum wage, implying that the short-time work labor cost increases with
the wage. However, short-time work employees are concentrated in the low part of the wage
distribution.19 Hence, the vast majority of short-time work employees benet from a 100% net
replacement rate over the period 2002-2014 and the rms using short-time work face almost no
short-time work cost since July 2013.
3.3 The beneciaries of the reforms
Very few rms use short-time work. As we see in Figure 3, in 2009, in the core of the recession,
about 1.2% of rms used short-time work. After the recession, this proportion fell to 0.3% and
increased afterwards thanks to the expansion of the scheme. However, this proportion remains
low, well below 1%. Short-time work hours also represent a tiny fraction of total hours of work:
17Note that the average hourly subsidy in 2013 is lower than in 2014 because the last reform which raised the
subsidy was passed in July 2013.
18The monthly sum of the net wage and the net short-time work benet cannot be inferior to the monthly
net minimum wage corresponding to the number of hours of work stipulated in the labor contract.
19Calavrezo and Lodin (2012).
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Figure 1: Total short-time work subsidy, total number of short-time work hours (left-hand side)
and hourly short-time work subsidy (right-hand side).
Sources: DADS (Insee), Sinapse (DGEFP) and Extranet (ASP).
Scope: mainland France excluding Corsica; market sectors excluding agriculture; rms using short-time work
for economic reasons.
Denition: the hourly short-time work subsidy is dened as the total short-time work subsidy divided by the
total number of short-time work hours.
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Figure 3: Proportion of short-time work rms (left-hand side) and proportion of short-time
work hours within hours worked (right-hand side).
Sources: DADS (Insee), Sinapse (DGEFP) and Extranet (ASP).
Scope: mainland France excluding Corsica; market sectors excluding agriculture; rms using short-time work
for economic reasons or not using short-time work at all for any reason over the entire period.
it lies below 0.1% in normal times and reached only 0.34% in 2009.
Moreover, short-time work hours are strongly concentrated in a small subset of rms among
short-time work users and a large share of those use short-time work recurrently. In order to
precisely dene recurrent short-time work use, we distinguish three categories of rms: (i) the
occasional, or non-recurrent users, whose consumption spans 1 to 2 years in the last 5 years; (ii)
the repeat users, whose consumption spans 3 to 4 years in the last 5 years; (iii) the systematic
users, whose consumption spans the last 5 years. As shown by Figure 4, recurrent short-time
work has swollen importance both in absolute and relative terms. The number of short-time
work hours consumed by systematic users steadily increased from 2 million to more than 10
million from 2006 to 2014. Their weight within overall short-time work hours also expanded:
it laid below 50% from 2006 to 2008, it dropped to 25% in 2009 and 2010 (in a countercyclical
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Table 1: Systematic short-time work rms in 2008 and in 2014
Nb of systematic Proportion of systematic users in 2008
users in 2008 which are still systematic users in 2014
Total 486 0.26
Among top 50% users 244 0.30
Among top 10% users 49 0.29
Among top 1% users 5 0.60
Source: DADS (Insee), Sinapse (DGEFP) and Extranet (ASP). Scope: mainland France excluding Corsica;
market sectors excluding agriculture; rms using short-time work for economic reasons. Note: There are 2501
systematic users in 2014.
way), and it increased to over 50% after the recession.
The expansion of short-time work has essentially yielded benets to a small fraction of
short-time work rms. As shown by Figure 5, the top 1% of rms using the highest number
of short-time work hours used about 50% of all those hours over the period 2006-2014. This is
related to the fact that short-time work rms are much larger than non short-time work rms, as
shown by Figure 6. Moreover, the size of rms increases with the degree of recurrence of short-
time work and systematic users account for a signicant portion of the intensive short-time
work users.
It is striking that the most important recurrent beneciaries of short-time work tend to
remain present over the whole period 2008-2014 covered by our study, as shown by Table 1.
The proportion of systematic short-time work users in 2008 which are still short-time work users
in 2014 is quite high and increases as the sample is restricted to the top of the distribution
of short-time work users according to the number of short-time work hours in 2008. Overall,
a large number of rms that recurrently and massively used short-time work in 2008 appear
to remain recurrent users in 2014, highlighting the fact that the pool of recurrent short-time
work users barely changes between 2008 and 2014. These rms, which are large, have strong
incentives to lobby for the expansion of this scheme and to oppose a system of unemployment
insurance with experience rating.
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Figure 4: Total number (left-hand side) and distribution (right-hand side) of short-time work
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4 Model
In order to analyze the consequences of recurrent short-time work, we present a model of an
economy where a subset of rms face seasonal uctuations in their revenue. Henceforth, we des-
ignate these rms as belonging to the seasonal sector. We start by describing the technology of
rms and the preferences of workers before dening the social optimum and its implementation
in the market economy.
We consider a one period economy in which a nal output, which is the numéraire, is
produced in quantity Y with two intermediate products thanks to the technology
Y = F (Ys; Yn)
where F is a constant returns to scale production function increasing and concave with respect
to its two arguments; Yi is the quantity of intermediate product i = s; n: Subscript s stands for
seasonal industry and n for non-seasonal industry. Intermediate products are produced with
labor only. One unit of labor produces one unit of intermediate product per period in each
sector. Labor is productive during a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the period in the seasonal industry
and it is productive throughout the period in the non-seasonal industry. Workers produce c0
units of nal output with home production technology in the fraction 1   of the year where
they are unproductive in the seasonal industry.
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of identical workers. They
consume the nal product. Their preferences are represented by the concave utility function
u(cj), where cj denotes the quantity of consumption of nal product of worker j: Each worker
o¤ers one unit of labor inelastically. Workers irreversibly choose the rm where they work at
the start of the period. This assumption accounts for moving costs across jobs in a simple way
as it implies that workers who choose to work in rms in the seasonal sector remain attached to
their rm when the rm is unproductive. Let S denote the number of workers in the seasonal
industry, the production of intermediate products is
Yn = 1  S and Ys = S:
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4.1 Social optimum
The social planner chooses the quantity of labor allocated to each sector and the consumption
of each worker that maximize the sum of the utilities subject to the feasibility constraint:
max
fcj ;Sg
Z 1
0
u(cj)dj
s.t.
Z 1
0
cjdj  F (1  S; S) + (1  )Sc0
Let us denote by  the multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint. The Lagrangian is
L =
Z 1
0
u(cj)dj + 

F (1  S; S) + (1  )Sc0  
Z 1
0
cjdj

The rst-order conditions are
u0(cj) =  for all j
F1 (1  S; S) = F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0
where Fi; i = 1; 2; denotes the partial derivative with respect to argument i: Thus, the socially
optimal allocation is the set (

cj
	
; S) which satises:
cj = F (1  S; S) + (1  )Sc0 for all j
F1 (1  S; S) = F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0 (1)
Henceforth, it is assumed that
F2 (1  S; S) > c0
to ensure that workers are more productive when they work on their job during productive
periods than when they work at home during unproductive periods.
At the social optimum, workers are fully insured inasmuch as they get the same consumption
whether they work in the seasonal or the non-seasonal industry. Workers are allocated between
sectors in order to equalize the marginal productivity of labor in each sector. In this context, if
the fraction of the year  when labor is productive diminishes, it is e¢ cient to reduce the share
of workers employed in the seasonal industry and to continue providing the same consumption
to all workers independently of the sector where they work.
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4.2 Decentralized equilibrium
In the decentralized economy, all markets are competitive and the timing of decisions is the
following. First, the state announces the level of benets provided to workers in the periods
when they are unproductive in the seasonal industry, together with the taxes necessary to fund
these expenses. Second, rms announce their labor demand functions. Third, workers choose
the industry in which they will work, being aware that this choice is irreversible.
In the decentralized equilibrium, individuals are indi¤erent between working either in sector
n or in sector s: An employee of sector n gets the wage wn and consumes all her wage. In sector
s individuals get the wage ws when they work and the benets b when they are on the dole.
Therefore, workers are indi¤erent as to which sector they choose if the following no-arbitrage
condition is fullled:
u(wn) = u(ws) + (1  )u(b+ c0): (2)
Let pi denote the unit price of intermediate product i: Prot maximization of rms which
produce the nal product yields the demands for intermediate products
F1(Yn; Ys) = pn and F2(Yn; Ys) = ps:
In the intermediate product industry, rms pay the wage wi plus taxes ti on labor to fund
the benets paid to workers during unproductive periods in the seasonal industry. It is assumed
that rms of the seasonal sector cannot commit to pay workers when they are unproductive.
This impossibility can arise, for instance, from the di¢ culty of verifying by a third party the
size of the drop in the revenue of the rm due to unproductive periods or from limited access
to credit due to capital market imperfection. Thus, in both intermediate sectors, workers get
income from rms only when they work. Assuming unitary returns to e¤ective labor, we can
express the prot maximization problem in the intermediate sector i as
max piYi   (wi + ti)Yi;
which implies that
pi = wi + ti; i = n; s:
In the decentralized equilibrium, labor demand is equal to labor supply in each industry,
implying that Yn = 1   S and Ys = S: Therefore, the decentralized equilibrium value of
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(wn; ws; S) is dened by the following system:8<:
u(wn) = u(ws) + (1  )u(b+ c0)
F1 (1  S; S) = wn + tn
F2 (1  S; S) = ws + ts
(3)
This decentralized equilibrium is feasible if the budget constraint of the state
(1  )Sb  Sts + (1  S)tn +  (4)
is satised, where  denotes a lump sum tax.
4.3 Social optimum implementation
The government can choose the value of (b; ts; tn; ) which implies that the decentralized equi-
librium yields the social optimum. Equations (1), (3) and (4) imply that the allocation of the
decentralized equilibrium is a social optimum if the following conditions are satised:
b+ c0 = wn = ws = F1 (1  S; S)
tn =  = 0
ts = b
1  

:
where S designates the socially optimal value of seasonal employment, dened by equation
(1).
This result shows that the social optimum is reached with benets which fully insure workers
against the drop in their income during the unproductive periods in the seasonal sector. It is
also clear that these benets have to be nanced with full experience rating, since tn =  = 0
and ts = b(1 )=. This means that there are no cross-subsidies between sectors. The seasonal
sector totally funds the expenses induced by the benets paid to idle workers. The amount of
tax paid by the seasonal industry during the productive periods, equal to tsS, matches the
total amount of benets given to the workers when they are idle, equal to (1  )bS:
In the laissez-faire economy, where b = tn = ts = t = 0; the size of the seasonal industry
is too small relative to its socially optimal size because risk aversion implies that workers need
a wage premium bigger than the loss of production induced by the unproductive periods in
the seasonal industry before they will accept to work in this industry. The size of the seasonal
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sector increases monotonically as b increases from 0 to its socially optimal value if benets b
are exclusively funded by the seasonal sector.20
However, the size of the seasonal sector can be too large if the seasonal sector does not fully
fund the benets. To show this, let us compute the decentralized equilibrium when short-time
work provides full insurance, b+ c0 = wn = ws. Labor demands imply
F1 (1  S; S)  F2(1  S; S) = tn   ts: (5)
The left hand side is an increasing function of S: Therefore, starting from a situation of full
experience rating, where ts = b (1  ) = and tn = 0; which implements the socially optimal
allocation, any decrease in ts; associated with an increase in either tn or  to satisfy the budget
constraint of the state, raises the share of the seasonal industry above its socially optimal
value. More generally, there is a non-monotonic relation between aggregate production, O =
Y + (1   )Sc0; and the feasible size of the seasonal sector when b increases if there is no
experience rating, as shown by Figure 7 (see Appendix A).21
Our model shows that an e¢ cient policy should provide unemployment insurance bene-
ts funded by experience rated employerscontributions instead of short-time work benets
nanced by public expenditure. In the system of unemployment insurance with experience rat-
ing, employers can lay their workers o¤during the unproductive periods but have to pay for the
induced cost to unemployment insurance. This system can incentivize employers to keep their
employees during unproductive periods. By contrast, if short-time work is strongly experience
rated and there is no experience rated unemployment insurance, employers prefer to get rid of
20To show this, let us write the no-arbitrage equation (2) at the decentralized equilibrium, assuming that
tn = 0 and that short-time work benets are funded by the seasonal industry exclusively, i.e. ts = b(1  )=:
We get
u [F1 (1  S; S)] = u

F2 (1  S; S)  1  

b

+ (1  )u(b+ c0):
Di¤erentiation with respect to S and b yields
dS
db
=
(1  ) [u0(b+ c0)  u0(ws)]
u0(wn) (F12   F11) + u0(ws) (F21   F22) :
The numerator is positive if b + c0 < ws: Since the production function is continuously twice derivable and
homogeneous of degree 1, we have F12 = F21 > 0. This implies that the denominator of this expression is
positive.
21Note that there exists a value of b which induces the socially optimal size of the seasonal sector S in Figure
7. However, the allocation is not socially optimal because workers are not fully insured (i.e. b+ c0 < w) for this
value of b:
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Figure 7: The relation between the size of the seasonal sector and output.
Note: S stands for the size of the seasonal industry at the social optimum and S at its maximum size, which
arises when short-time work provides full insurance to workers and short-time work is not experience rated.
their employees during unproductive periods in order to avoid paying the cost associated with
short-time work. Obviously, if short-time work is strongly funded by the state and induces very
small cost to the employers, short-time work becomes attractive for employers and short-time
work is then a means to insure workers. However, this is an ine¢ cient way to provide insur-
ance, as it entails cross-sector subsidies which induce a seasonal sector that is too large ( S on
Figure 7) relative to its socially optimal level. Nevertheless, after the recession, under pressure
from industries in a position to benet from short-time work subsidies, the French reforms have
implemented a short-time work scheme strongly funded by the state and inducing a very small
cost to the employers. The next section evaluates the cost of this ine¢ cient strategy.
5 The evaluation of the cost of ine¢ cient short-time
work
The reforms passed after the great 2008-2009 recession aimed at boosting short-time work by
reducing its cost to the employers while providing generous replacement incomes to short-time
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work employees. Thanks to these reforms, the cost of short-time work to employers dropped
dramatically (see Figure 2). In this section, we compare the level of aggregate output after the
reforms with the level of output that could be achieved with perfect unemployment insurance
and full experience rating, which corresponds to the socially optimal allocation.
At low wage levels, short-time work employees have a very small income drop over the whole
2002-2014 period. In the neighborhood of the minimum wage, there is no income drop (see
Figure 2). As short-time work employees are concentrated on the low part of the wage distrib-
ution, the case where short-time work employees are fully insured is a relevant approximation
of the situation of French workers. At this wage level, the short-time work cost to employers is
equal to zero. In this case, the aggregate production loss with respect to the case where there
is perfect insurance with full experience rating is (see Appendix B):
O '  1
2
(Short-time work public expenditure targeted at systematic users) (6)
The short-time work public expenditure targeted at systematic users comprises the benets
b paid to idle workers. Equation (6) shows that the short-time work public expenditure has
a negative impact on output, with respect to the socially optimal allocation (see Figure 7).
Output is lower than at the socially optimal allocation because employment is higher in the
seasonal sector, where workers are less productive, when workers are insured with short-time
work benets nanced by public expenditure. This mechanism entails major production losses
as each euro of short-time work expenditure entails a drop in production of about 0.5 euro.
According to equation (6), the production loss induced by systematic short-time work users
can be computed merely from their short-time work subsidies. As shown by Figure 8, systematic
short-time work users obtained about 55% of total short-time work subsidies after the reforms.
Therefore, the output loss induced by the short-time work subsidies targeted at systematic users
is equal to 0:5 0:55 ' 0:27 times the total public expenditure on short-time work. As public
expenditure on short-time work reached about 150 million euros in 2014, after the reforms (see
Figure 1), the production loss induced by short-time work amounts to about 40 million euros
in 2014.
This is a conservative evaluation, for several reasons. First, a less restrictive denition of
recurrent users, including repeat users, who use 60% of total short-time work expenditure,
entails an output loss equal to 30% of the change in short-time work public expenditure instead
of 27%: Second, our model assumes that the number of short-time work hours per employee
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does not depend on the cost of short-time work to employers. The only source of production
loss is the displacement of workers from the non-seasonal to the seasonal sector. Including the
adjustment of hours of work would increase the production loss induced by short-time work.
Third, as the evaluation focuses on recurrent short-time work only, production losses due to
the drop in hours of work of non-recurrent short-time work users are neglected.
All in all, it is clear that French reforms to short-time work have not been e¢ cient inasmuch
as they have greatly beneted recurrent short-time work users. Now, it is certainly desirable
to limit the expansion of short-time work on the part of recurrent users. This can be achieved
by increasing the short-time work cost to the employers. The increase in the short-time work
cost to the employers should be complemented by mandatory unemployment insurance with
experience rating, which is more e¢ cient than short-time work at providing insurance to workers
employed in seasonal industries. Our analysis suggests that its implementation would increase
output signicantly. Obviously, current systematic short-time work users are likely to strongly
oppose this reform.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the French reforms aimed at boosting short-time work after the great
2008-2009 recession have entailed sizeable ine¢ ciencies. These reforms have greatly beneted
large rms which are recurrent short-time work users, and have entailed large production losses
with respect to a socially optimal allocation, implemented with experience rated unemployment
insurance.
This result does not mean that short-time work is useless when combined with unemploy-
ment insurance. Short-time work can be useful when rms have limited access to credit due to
capital market imperfection.22 However, more research is needed to gain a better understanding
of the optimal way to integrate short-time work and unemployment insurance in a dynamic
context with imperfect capital market, when employment can be adjusted at the intensive and
the extensive margins.
22Cahuc, Kramarz and Nevoux (2017).
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Figure 8: Total (left-hand side) and distribution (right-hand side) of short-time work subsidy
according to the degree of recurrence of short-time work.
Sources: DADS (Insee), Sinapse (DGEFP) and Extranet (ASP).
Scope: mainland France excluding Corsica; market sectors excluding agriculture; rms using short-time work
for economic reasons.
Note: 5 yearsstands for the systematic users, whose consumption spans the last 5 years; 3-4 yearsstands
for the repeat users, whose consumption spans 3 to 4 years in the last 5 years; 1-2 years stands for the
occasional, or non-recurrent users, whose consumption spans 1 to 2 years in the last 5 years.
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A The relation between aggregate production and the
size of the seasonal sector in the absence of experience
rating
This appendix describes the relation between aggregate production, O = Y + (1  )Sc0; and
the size of the seasonal sector when the change in the size of the seasonal sector is induced
by changes in the benets b provided to idle workers in the absence of experience rating. It
is assumed that the benets b are nanced by the lump-sum tax  : The equilibrium size of
seasonal employment is determined by
u(F1 (1  S; S)) = u(F2 (1  S; S)) + (1  )u(b+ c0) (7)
Equation (7) denes the function S(b) which fullls
F1 (1  S(b); S(b))  F2 (1  S(b); S(b))  (1  )c0 = (b) (8)
where  is a function whose properties are dened below. These properties are dened for
b 2 0; F2  1  S;  S  c0 ; where
S = fS : F1 (1  S; S) = F2(1  S; S)g ; (9)
assuming that F2
 
1  S;  S > c0 to ensure that the marginal worker produces more when
she works in the seasonal sector during productive periods than at home during unproductive
periods. The properties of function  are:
1. 0(b) > 0, because di¤erentiation of equation (7) implies that dS=db > 0;
2. (0) < 0, because, when b = 0; equation (7) together with the concavity of the utility
function u implies that F1 (1  S; S) < F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0;
3. (F2(1   S;  S)   c0)) = (1   )

F2
 
1  S;  S  c0 > 0; because equation (7) im-
plies that S = S when b = F2
 
1  S;  S   c0; then, as S satises F1  1  S;  S =
F2(1   S;  S), equation (8) implies that (b) = (1   )

F2
 
1  S;  S  c0 when
b = F2
 
1  S;  S  c0;
4. (b) = 0, S = S; which is immediate from equation (7) dening S
F1 (1  S; S) = F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0: (10)
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and equation (8).
Equations (10) and (9) imply that S > S because equation (10) can be written as
F1 (1  S; S) F2 (1  S; S) = (1 ) [c0   F2 (1  S; S)] < 0 which implies that S <
S since F1 (1  S; S) F2 (1  S; S) increases with S and F1
 
1  S;  S F2(1  S;  S) = 0:
Therefore, we have S > S > S(0) and the properties of (b) imply that: (b) < 0, S(b) < S
and (b) > 0, S(b) > S.
The derivative of aggregate production, F (1  S; S) + (1  )Sc0; with respect to S is
 F1 (1  S; S) + F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0
From equation (8), this term is equal to  (b): Therefore, aggregate production increases with
b if S(b) < S and decreases with b if S(b) > S (see Figure 7).
B The evaluation of the cost of ine¢ cient short-time
work
This appendix presents the impact on aggregate production of changes in the size of the seasonal
sector induced by changes in the share of the contributions of employers in the seasonal sector
to the cost of short-time work when workers are fully insured (i.e. b + c0 = w); assuming, for
the sake of simplicity, that the short-time work expenditure is nanced with lump-sum tax 
in the absence of experience rating (i.e. ts = tn = 0). The supplementary cost per unit of labor
in the seasonal sector induced by the contribution at rate  is equal to (1 )b=; so that the
tax per unit of labor in the seasonal sector is equal to (1   )b=. In this context, drops in
 decrease the labor cost in the seasonal sector, which leads to increased employment in that
sector at the expense of the non-seasonal sector.
The impact of changes in the size of the seasonal sector on aggregate output, O = F (1  S; S)+
(1  )c0; can be computed as:
dO = [ F1 (1  S; S) + F2 (1  S; S) + (1  )c0]dS (11)
From prot maximization, we get F1(1   S; S) = w;F2(1   S; S) = w + (1   )b=:
Perfect insurance implies that b = w   c0: Substituting these relations in equation (11) yields:
dO
dS
=  (1  )b(1  ) (12)
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We compute the change in output induced by changes in the size of the seasonal sector
in the neighborhood of S; where  = 0 (see equation (9)). Evaluating the impact of S on
aggregate output from equation (12) using the slope of the relation between output and S at
S (see Figure 7) over-estimates the impact of changes in S on aggregate output when  goes
from 0 to 1; or equivalently, when S goes from S to S: In order to approximate the production
loss induced by the short-time work expenditure with no experience rating with respect to the
socially optimal allocation S, we evaluate dO=dS at  = 1 in equation (12), and we use the
average of dO=dS evaluated at these two values, i.e.  = 1 and  = 0. We get
O
S
'   b
2
(1  ):
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